Brand affiliation: high concentration, but groups that are themselves constrained in their growth

3.4.1 — The market fact: high concentration, measured on the right basis

Two measures must be kept apart (see also note ^ᵇ). By number of hotels, integrated chains (brands such as ibis, Mercure and Campanile, whether owned, franchised or under a management agreement) account for approximately 18%–19% of French hotel supply.^¹⁰⁰ By number of rooms, according to Coach Omnium's 2021 panorama, their weight is much higher: 41%–42% of the total, with an average capacity of 85 rooms, versus 26 for other hotels.^¹⁰¹

France's branded share of rooms is not an isolated anomaly in Europe. Dispersion across European countries is wide: from 18% of rooms under a brand in Italy and Austria to 61% in Spain. The measures do not, however, cover the same perimeter: the foreign reports count networks such as Best Western among chains, whereas the French 41% excludes them. On a like-for-like perimeter, France would therefore likely sit at least at Germany's level (42%). What sets France apart is the comparison with the United States, where more than 70% of rooms carry a brand, mostly under franchise.^¹⁰²

A point of vocabulary matters here, to avoid overstating the phenomenon: the French figure covers integrated chains only. It excludes voluntary chains, cooperatives and consortiums (Logis, Best Western, Teritoria and others), which federate many independents, each hotel keeping its own name and autonomy. These networks span a wide range, from a simple marketing banner to a structured cooperative. Best Western France, for example, defines itself not as a chain but as a cooperative of independent hoteliers under France's cooperative and associated retail model: it is governed by a board of hoteliers elected by their peers, which votes the budgets; it has no shareholders to pay and reinvests its profits in the network. Pooling goes well beyond the membership fee: shared distribution, an in-house training school, revenue management and a loyalty program.

Yet this form of affiliation, the most accessible one for independent midscale hotels, has eroded over the long term: voluntary networks are "losing members massively," notes Coach Omnium, with 42% fewer between 2008 and its 2022 census (3,823 hotels versus nearly 6,600), and approximately 20% fewer since 2016.^¹⁰³ This decline, however, is a net figure and should not be confused with the gross sign-ups the networks announce each year. Some networks are even growing against the trend, precisely because they have moved beyond the marketing-banner stage. Best Western France, structured as a cooperative with integrated services, grew its network to more than 330 hotels in 2025 through new affiliations.^¹⁰⁴ Groupe Logis Hôtels also reports rising sign-ups, while remaining, like the category as a whole, below its level of twenty years ago. The causes cited by the industry include competition from platforms, whose commissions are due on honored bookings (and, depending on the contract, on certain billed cancellations and no-shows) whereas voluntary-chain fees are fixed, which leads some hoteliers to leave their network, judging that platforms bring them more guests at lower financial risk;^¹⁰⁵ rising fees on already fragile properties; and, in our reading, the closure of small members, which mechanically shrinks the networks. We did not identify any published survey that ranks these causes. The networks are also being reshaped: in 2025, Groupe Logis Hôtels acquired Teritoria, which, together with Demeures & Châteaux and Singuliers Hôtels, forms what the group presents as the leading premium cluster of independent hotels and restaurants in France.^¹⁰⁶

The signal is twofold and matters for what follows: the affiliation route best suited to the independent core is shrinking, and competition from platforms, which capture the customer relationship, is contributing to this. Independent midscale hotels are thus doubly isolated: too small for integrated brands, and leaving voluntary networks for dependence on OTAs.

Finally, within integrated chains, the market rests on a few major players: according to Coach Omnium's 2021 panorama, Accor accounted for nearly half of integrated-chain hotels, and three groups (Accor, Louvre Hotels and B&B) together accounted for approximately 85%.^¹⁰⁷ This is not a criticism; it is a structural fact. French branded hospitality is carried by a small number of leading operators.

3.4.2 — Why brands are less present among independent midscale hotels: groups under constraint too

The useful exercise is not to judge this structure but to understand why brands invest little in independent midscale hotels. The answer lies less in a deliberate choice than in a set of constraints weighing on the groups themselves, which are, at bottom, the same constraints that squeeze the independents.

First constraint: a limited stock to convert, and blocked land. Chain development was "sluggish," in Coach Omnium's words in 2021: integrated supply grows slowly while the total number of hotels declines.^¹⁰⁸ The reason ties back to Pressure 1: there is almost no land left for new construction in sought-after locations, and the existing stock that could be converted to brand standards is limited. Groups hit the same land wall as everyone else: they cannot develop what cannot be built or brought up to standard.

Second constraint: a stock whose size profile does not fit a brand. Coach Omnium documents this bottleneck on both sides of the market.^¹⁰⁹ On the brand side, recruiting new franchisees is stalling: few existing properties meet the brands' criteria for location, size and service level. In practice, a hotel with fewer than fifty rooms rarely falls within an integrated chain's scope. On the operator side, the entry ticket and the burden of brand standards deter some candidates. The French independent stock (small, underinvested, scattered across rural areas) does not match the profile a brand can integrate without a heavy renovation, which financing constraints (Pressure 3) put out of reach. It is not that groups reject the midscale segment: most of this stock is simply not "convertible" as it stands.

This bottleneck has nonetheless shifted recently, and the shift is worth noting. Deprived of growth from new construction, the major groups have turned the existing independent stock into their new development pipeline. Since 2019, each has launched so-called "conversion" brands or collection brands designed to bring independent hotels on board: greet (Accor, 2019), Handwritten Collection (Accor, 2023), Spark by Hilton (2023) and Garner (IHG, 2023), among others.^¹¹⁰ The door is thus opening slightly. But it opens selectively, and the selection criteria redraw the same boundary: greet targets properties markedly larger than the average French independent; Spark makes entry conditional on a full renovation of guest-facing areas, precisely the kind of investment the squeeze puts out of reach; charm collections recruit assets that are already desirable. The affiliation gap does not close; it shifts. The top of the independent stock gains a new path to value creation; the independent core, too small, too tired and too underfinanced, is left behind, and the chains' own selection accelerates the sorting.

Investors confirm this shift in their intentions: in CBRE's 2026 survey of European hotel investors, the share of respondents stating a preference for independent hotels falls from 40% to 24% in one year, in favor of global brands and collection brands.^¹¹¹ Among these investors, the unaffiliated asset is also losing appeal. The affiliation gap now shows in investors' stated preferences, although we did not find any transaction data that measures its effect on prices.

Third constraint: their geographic footprint is not that of the independent core. Integrated brands have a massive presence in France. They operate a dense midscale and upscale network (Novotel in the 4-star category, Mercure in 3–4-star) and an even denser economy network (ibis, 2- to 3-star, ibis Budget, Première Classe, B&B, Campanile). The notion, on a quick reading, that brands are "barely present in midscale" does not hold: they cover every star category, including 2-star and 3-star. The dividing line lies elsewhere: between the branded hotel, often recent or renovated to standard, located in a business district or high-traffic area, with a markedly higher average capacity; and the independent core hotel, smaller (28 rooms on average, versus 83 for all chain hotels according to INSEE, note 101) and geographically scattered.^¹¹² It is not that brands ignore the 2–3-star segment. They grow in it mainly through hotels under their own flags, usually franchised, in the urban business and suburban segment, and integrate existing independents only selectively, through conversion brands, when a hotel's profile allows a takeover without heavy renovation. In our reading, the decline of the business-travel engine could make some brands cautious about this segment and steer their growth toward conversion or upscale.

Fourth constraint: an asset-light model that points elsewhere. The major groups have also changed their model. Faced with soaring real-estate values, they sold their hotel real estate and kept only the management, under an asset-light policy. This model gives them capacity for rapid expansion and lower financial risk, but it naturally steers their growth toward assets with enough size and standing to carry a brand, not toward the small core hotel. The result is not a deliberate withdrawal: it is a mechanical effect of their value-creation logic.

In short, brands do not ignore midscale: they are present in it, but mainly through hotels under their own flags and on their own criteria, integrating independents only selectively. They struggle to integrate the independent core hotel (small, scattered) not for lack of interest but because, like that hotel, they are caught in the same squeeze: scarce land, a stock that is hard to convert, a shrinking business segment. This matters, because it opens a forward-looking question rather than an indictment: under what conditions could independent midscale hotels become attractive to them again?

3.4.3 — What the absence of brands costs the stock: quality, financing and bargaining power

Whatever the cause, the limited presence of brands among independent midscale hotels has three concrete consequences for the health of the stock.

Quality. A brand imposes standards (service level, periodic renovation, service criteria), and competition between brands pushes those standards up. Independent midscale hotels, outside this system, lack that spur. The sector itself acknowledges it: Mark Watkins (Coach Omnium) points to "a serious modernity gap" and "a service offering often ill-suited to guest expectations," which he attributes to the small size of the hotels and the insufficient returns of small units.^¹¹³ In our reading, and even though in his view chains are not exempt, a greater brand presence in this segment would lift the quality of the stock.

Financing. Brand affiliation sends lenders a reassuring risk signal (brand visibility, operating manuals, central reservation system, guest loyalty, and often the brand's banking partnerships) that, according to these sources, eases access to credit, particularly for an acquisition or a heavy renovation.^¹¹⁴ A stand-alone independent with a comparable operating track record has neither that signal nor those partnerships. This gap compounds the financing thresholds described under Pressure 3 and, through the financing channel, reinforces the sorting that brands perform on the stock.

Bargaining power. This is the angle most directly useful to an owner. The contract binding a hotelier to a brand, whether a franchise or a management agreement, is negotiable, but often against operators well versed in such structures, and starting from their own draft contract. Yet the room for maneuver is real: the balance between base fees and incentive fees, performance tests based on GOP or RevPAR with a termination right, and approval rights over the budget and key staff.^ᶠ The ability to win concessions depends largely on the owner's leverage: does the owner hold several hotels under the brand, does it develop new ones, does it understand what is at stake?

The imbalance therefore widens for the stand-alone, single-asset independent without specialist advice. The point is not to pit independents against brands but to create the conditions for a market in which both have an interest in coming together.